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In this paper we endogenize ﬁxed price time-dependent rules to examine the output
eﬀects of monetary disinﬂation. We derive the optimal rules in and out of inﬂationary
steady states, and develop a methodology to aggregate individual pricing rules which
vary through time. Because of strategic complementarities we have to solve both
problems simultaneously. This allows us to reassess the output costs of monetary
disinﬂations, including aspects such as the roles of the initial level of inﬂation, and of
the degree of strategic complementarity in price. Finally, we relax the strict assumption
of pure time-dependent rules by allowing price setters to reevaluate their rules at the
time disinﬂation is announced.
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11 Introduction
It is largely believed that nominal rigidities have important consequences for the eﬀect of
monetary policy. Among several alternatives, the primary dynamic speciﬁcation of nominal
rigidity used to analyze monetary disinﬂations is a ﬁxed price time-dependent rule, due to
Taylor (1979, 1980). In this model each price setter chooses the price that will be ﬁxed
during a predetermined period of time1. Since this rule is usually postulated rather than
derived2, the time period between adjustments is exogenous. This way of proceeding is
clearly inadequate when there are changes in the environment, as is the case when policy
rules are changed. When monetary authorities launch a disinﬂationary program they usually
claim that the monetary rule will be changed.
In order to analyze the eﬀe c to no u t p u to fad i s i n ﬂationary monetary policy in a proper
setting, it is necessary to endogenize the ﬁxed price time-dependent rules followed by price
setters and aggregate them. This endeavour is straightforward when it is assumed that the
economy is in an inﬂationary steady state. However, when analyzing the cost of disinﬂation,
o n ei si n t e r e s t e di nt h eo u t p u te ﬀects during the transition between steady states. This
requires solving less trivial optimization problems and developing a more general aggregation
methodology. Furthermore, since each individual price depends on the aggregate price, both
optimization and aggregation problems have to be solved simultaneously.
The derivation of endogenous ﬁxed price time-dependent rules requires understanding the
hypotheses that support their optimality. Either the costs of changing prices or of gathering
information taken individually would not be enough. The former would generate a rule with
ﬁxed prices but which is state-dependent (Sheshinski and Weiss 1977, 1983) while the latter
would generate a time-dependent rule with a preset price path rather than a ﬁxed price
(Caballero 1989). If we assume the two types of costs are present, then the optimal rule is
both time- and state-dependent (Bonomo and Garcia 2001). In order to justify the ﬁxed
price time-dependent rule it is necessary to assume that those two kinds of costs are borne
together. For example, one cannot choose to incur the cost of information and after the
1Calvo (1983) introduced a variant of this rule in which adjustment time is stochastic, with a constant
hazard rate. This version is widely used nowadays because it is analytically more convenient.
2One exception is Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988).
2optimal price is known decide whether to incur the adjustment cost and change the price.
The hypothesis here is that once the single type of cost is incurred, one can get informed and
change the price without any extra cost. The assumption is appealing because it rationalizes
the ﬁxed price time-dependent rule.
The endogeneity of time-dependent rules has important aggregate eﬀects. Disinﬂation
causes a longer recession with endogenous than with exogenous rules. When agents set new
prices during a disinﬂation, they do it for longer periods of time than before because the
loss involved in keeping the price ﬁxed for some period of time will be smaller. The longer
periods between adjustments increase the length of the recession, since it takes more time
to eliminate the hangover eﬀect of past ﬁxed prices.
Disinﬂation also tends to cause a deeper recession when evaluated in an endogenous rules
setting. This happens as long as money growth is not cut to zero. The reason is that agents
with longer horizons set higher prices when faced with lower but still positive inﬂation.3
Thus, when the endogeneity of rules is taken into consideration, it is not as easy to disinﬂate
as in Ball (1994), who used an exogenous rules setting.
The issue of whether it is easier to disinﬂate when the initial inﬂa t i o ni sh i g ht h a nw h e n
it is low becomes more complex, when examined with endogenous rules. If on the one hand
contract lengths are shorter when inﬂation is high (as mentioned by Blanchard, 1997), on
the other hand the hangover eﬀect is stronger.4 Therefore, the eﬀect of a given disinﬂation
policy when the initial inﬂation is higher is a more intense but shorter recession.
Endogenous rules have been used recently in order to evaluate monetary policy eﬀects
in the context of state-dependent pricing. Caplin and Leahy (1997) derive and aggregate
optimal state-dependent pricing rules to investigate the dynamics of output when nominal
aggregate demand follows a driftless process. Dotsey et al. (1999) embed endogenous state-
dependent rules in a general equilibrium setting to examine the eﬀect of a monetary shock.
The issue of disinﬂation costs with endogenous state-dependent rules is analyzed by Almeida
and Bonomo (2002). The results are qualitatively diﬀerent from those obtained in this work,
3When money growth is cut to zero, endogeneity tends to attenuate the recessive eﬀect. The diﬀerence
is that in this case agents with longer horizons will face a period with more stable prices at the end of their
contracts. Because of discounting, those agents will set prices closer to the optimal (smaller) level.
4Price-setters which adjusted a little bit before the announcement set higher relative prices, antecipating
t h a tt h e yw o u l db ee r o d e db yah i g h e ri n ﬂation rate.
3illustrating the fact that the type of nominal rigidity is an important modeling choice in
macroeconomics. For example, while endogeneity of time-dependent rules increases inﬂation
inertia, endogeneity of state-dependent rules contributes to mitigate it.
Pure state-dependent rules require that price-setters continuously observe all relevant
information about state variables, and evaluate the convenience of adjustment (see Bonomo
and Garcia, 2001, and Woodford, 2003). This is not an innocuous assumption. In fact,
information collection and decision-making costs are often mentioned as more important
than adjustment costs (Zbaracki et al., 2000). Thus, it is not surprising that time-dependent
rules are considered more realistic. According to Blinder et al. (1998), time-dependent rules
are twice as common as state-dependent rules.5
On the other hand, price-setters using time-dependent rules ignore important and widely
known changes in the environment until their next preset adjustment time. Since this kind
of information usually becomes available at no cost and could have an important impact on
optimal decisions, it is not reasonable to assume that decision makers will ignore it. This
motivated us to relax strict time-dependency by allowing price-setters to re-evaluate their
pricing rules at the time disinﬂation is announced. This is made in order to take into account
the new macroeconomic policy, which we assume is a free and widely available information.
The impact of re-evaluation becomes increasingly important for higher initial inﬂation
rates. In comparison with the case of strict time-dependent rules, the model with re-
evaluation generates a more abrupt, less deep and longer recession. The recession is more
abrupt because reevaluation triggers immediate price adjustments, with price increases out-
numbering decreases. The reason for a more attenuated recession is that an important part
of the hangover eﬀect is mitigated by the anticipated adjustments of ﬁrms with high relative
prices. Finally, ﬁrms with prices close to their optimal decide to postpone their planned
adjustment, extending the recessive impact of the disinﬂationary policy.6
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our method-
5In their interview study they found that nearly 60% of the ﬁrms said that they do have periodic price
reviews, while 30% said they do not. The remaining ﬁrms said that they do have periodic reviews for some
products but not for others.
6The net impact is recessive since, among ﬁrms which decide to postpone adjustments (because their
prices are close to their expected optimal levels), ﬁrms with higher relative prices outnumber those with
lower ones.
4ology. We derive and characterize optimal pricing rules under steady state. We also solve for
optimal pricing rules during disinﬂation, and develop a methodology for aggregating them.
Section 3 presents our results for pricing rules, and output during disinﬂation. In section
4, we relax the hypothesis of strict time-dependency by introducing re-evaluation of pricing
rules at the time disinﬂation is announced. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
Our modeling strategy is to build on the static model results of Blanchard and Kiyotaki
(1987), and Ball and Romer (1989). Starting from the speciﬁcation of preferences, en-
dowments and technology, these models derive individual optimal price equations at each
moment as a function of aggregate demand (Ball and Romer) or directly as a function of
the money supply and price level (Blanchard and Kiyotaki). In order to generate individual
uncertainty about the optimal individual price, we add an idiosyncratic shock process to the
optimal price equation obtained in those models. These shocks are permanent and thus,
together with the money supply process, generate intertemporal links which make the model
dynamic.7
Our economy is populated by an inﬁnite collection of identical (in all aspects other than
the timing of adjustments and realization of idiosyncratic shocks) imperfectly competitive
ﬁr m si n d e x e di nt h ei n t e r v a l[0,1]. We assume that the optimal level of the individual relative
price, in the absence of frictions, is given by:
p
∗
i − p = θy + ei, (1)
where p∗
i is the individual frictionless optimal price, p is the average level of prices, y is
aggregate demand and ei is an idiosyncratic shock to the optimal price level (all variables
are in log).8 Since ﬁrms are identical (although they can have diﬀerent prices and supply
7Having a dynamic macro model with intertemporal consumption and investment decisions would com-
plicate the model without aﬀecting the main insights.
8Equation 1 states that the relative optimal price depends on aggregate demand and on shocks speciﬁc
to the ﬁrm. It can be derived from utility maximization in a yeoman farmer economy, as in Ball and Romer
(1989).





where xi(t) is the price charged by the ﬁrm i at time t.
Nominal aggregate demand is given by the quantity of money:
y + p = m.
Substituting the above equation into equation (1) yields:9
p
∗
i = θm+( 1− θ)p + ei. (2)
If there were no costs to adjust prices and/or obtain information about the frictionless
optimal price level, each ﬁrm would choose xi(t)=p∗
i(t) and the resulting aggregate price
level would be p(t)=m(t). Thus aggregate output and individual prices would be given by
y(t)=0and xi(t)=m(t)+ei(t), respectively.
We assume that the ﬁrm can neither observe the stochastic components of p∗
i nor adjust
its price based on the known components of p∗
i without paying a lump-sum cost F.O n
the other hand, to let the price drift away from the optimal entails expected proﬁt losses,
which ﬂow at rate Et0(xi(t)−p∗
i(t))2,w h e r et0 is the last time of observation and adjustment
and Et0 is the expectation conditioned on the information available at that time.10 Time is
discounted at a constant rate ρ.
Given the stochastic process for the optimal price, each price setter solves for the optimal
pricing rule. The cost function after paying the adjustment/information gathering cost at a
9This equation can also be derived directly from other speciﬁcations, such as Blanchard and Kiyotaki
(1987), where real balances enter the utility function.
10Observe that this form corresponds to a second order Taylor approximation to the expected proﬁtl o s s
f o rh a v i n gap r i c ed i ﬀerent from the optimal one whenever the second derivative of the proﬁtf u n c t i o ni s
constant.
6certain time t0, can be written in the following way:
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∗
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where tj is a time of adjustment/information gathering and xi(tj) is the price chosen at time
tj.
Next we use this general framework to analyze optimal pricing rules in steady state and
during disinﬂation.
2.1 Steady State
We assume that for each i, ei follows a driftless Brownian motion with coeﬃcient of diﬀusion
σ and that those individual processes e0
is are independent of each other. We also assume
that the money supply has a deterministic constant rate of growth µ.11 In steady state
the aggregate price level will grow at the same rate µ.12 As a consequence, the frictionless




i = µdt + σdWi. (4)
Given the Markovian nature of the stochastic process for the frictionless optimal price
and the lump-sum type of adjustment/information gathering cost, the problem of the ﬁrm
after paying this cost does not depend either on the speciﬁc time when the problem is solved
or on the realization of the frictionless optimal p r i c ea tt h a tt i m e .A na d e q u a t es t a t ev a r i a b l e
for the ﬁrm’s problem in steady state is the deviation of the individual price xi from the
frictionless optimal level:
zi(t) ≡ xi(t) − p
∗
i(t).
11For simplicity we assume that there are no aggregate shocks.
12This will be veriﬁed below.
7Thus, if at t the price deviation is z, the price deviation at t + s is given by:13
z (t + s)=z + p
∗
i (t + s) − p
∗
i (t).
Hence we can formalize the optimization problem through the following Bellman Equa-
tion:













where Vµ represents the value function for the steady state problem with money growth rate





















where τ∗ and z∗ are the optimal contract length and the individual price deviation chosen
at the beginning of the contract, respectively. Using the process of the frictionless optimal



























We can substitute (8) into (10) and then substitute (9) into the resulting expression to
13We drop the i subscript for the individual price deviation z, because it is the same for all adjusting
ﬁrms.
14The value function in steady state will be the same for all ﬁrms, because it depends on the parameters
of the stochastic process for p∗
i and not on its realizations.


































Based on the above equation, we can prove the following (the proof is in Appendix A):
Proposition 1 The optimal contract length in steady state, τ∗, satisﬁes:
a.dτ∗
dµ µ<0;15 b.dτ∗
dσ < 0; c.dτ∗
dθ =0 ; d.dτ∗
dF > 0; e. d2τ∗
dµdσµ>0
The optimal contract length has the expected features. It is decreasing in |µ| and σ
since higher inﬂation or idiosyncratic uncertainty would result in larger quadratic deviations
from the frictionless optimal price if τ∗ were kept constant (see, for example, Figures 1a and
1b). An increase in F raises the adjustment costs associated with a given contract length,
resulting in a higher τ∗. The degree of strategic complementarity, 1 − θ,d o e sn o ta ﬀect the
choice of τ∗.16 Finally a higher µ (σ) reduces the sensitivity of τ∗ with respect to σ (µ). The
optimal contract length tends to increase with ρ essentially because the beneﬁto fp o s t p o n i n g
adjustment becomes higher.17
The level of inﬂation will have aggregate eﬀects even in the steady state. To see this,
we ﬁrst ﬁnd the aggregate price level using the method of undetermined coeﬃcients (see






















15Note that this is equivalent to dτ∗
dµ < 0 for µ>0 and dτ∗
dµ > 0 for µ<0.
16This is because it only aﬀects the level of variables p(t) and p∗
i(t), but not their growth rates. This
ceases to be true out of the steady state, as will be seen in the next section.
17This was true for all numerical simulations we performed.
9which depends both on the inﬂation level and on the degree of strategic complementarity.
For a positive (negative) inﬂation, the output level is above (below) the natural level for a
frictionless economy.18 As pointed out by Danziger (1988) in a deterministic state-dependent
model, the reason is that discounting induces ﬁrms to set prices closer to the optimal at the
beginning of the contract, resulting in a lower (higher) aggregate price level. The magnitude
of the output level is increasing in the degree of strategic complementarity (1 − θ), as illus-
trated in Figure 2.19 The reason is that, with higher strategic complementarity, each ﬁrm’s
optimal price will be more inﬂuenced by the other ﬁrms’ price deviations, reinforcing the
incentive to deviate from the frictionless level.
In our simulations, we follow Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) in setting σ =3 % .W e
calibrate F in such a way that with µ =3 % , σ =3 %and ρ =2 .5% ay e a r ,aﬁrm chooses to
collect information and adjust its price once a year. As a result we set F =0 .000595.T h i s
frequency of adjustments is consistent with the ﬁndings of Carlton (1986) and Blinder (1991)
that in the American economy the median ﬁrm adjusts its price approximately once a year.
As a test for that conﬁguration of parameters we can assess whether the adjustment intervals
generated for high inﬂation are plausible. With µ =1(annual inﬂation of 172%) prices are
adjusted once every 2 months and with µ =2 .5 (annual inﬂation of 1120%), the frequency
of adjustments increases to once a month. Those implications are consistent with available
empirical evidence for high inﬂation countries, such as Brazil during the 80s (Ferreira 1994).
2.2 Disinﬂation
To our knowledge, all articles which use time-dependent rules in order to analyze the eﬀect
of disinﬂations have assumed that the pricing rules inherited from the inﬂationary steady
state do not change during disinﬂation. So, there is no optimization with respect to pricing
policies and aggregation is straightforward given the initial distribution of adjustment times.
In this section we relax this simplifying assumption by deriving optimal pricing rules















10and an aggregation problem. In the absence of strategic complementarities (θ =1 )t h e s e
problems can be solved separately. Otherwise they must be solved simultaneously. In this
case, the optimal rule depends on the expected path for the aggregate price level and the
path for the aggregate price results from the aggregation of the individual pricing rules.
In the following subsections we ﬁrst explain separately the optimal pricing rule problem
and our aggregation methodology. In the next section we present the results for speciﬁc
disinﬂation paths.
2.2.1 Optimal Pricing Rules
A disinﬂation is announced at t =0 . The problem of a ﬁrm adjusting at t>0 can be
characterized by the following Bellman equation:














−ρτ(t)V (t + τ (t)).










Et [xi(t) − p
∗
i(t + τ(t))]
2 − ρF − ρV (t + τ (t)) + V
0 (t + τ (t)) = 0. (14)
The problem above can be solved recursively, assuming that after a long time the economy
will reach a new steady state. Thus, for t large enough, V (t)=Vµ0,w h e r eVµ0 is the value
function for the new steady state (money growth rate µ0).
2.2.2 Aggregation
In most models in the literature the time-dependent rule is exogenous, or the economy
i sa s s u m e dt ob ei na ni n ﬂationary steady state (as in Ball, Mankiw and Romer 1988).




0 x(t − s)ds,w h e r ex(s) is the average price of ﬁrms which set
11prices at s.
With endogenous rules in a changing environment, the contract length changes through
time. As a consequence, the distribution of price adjustments will be changing accordingly,
and aggregation requires monitoring the evolution of this distribution. We develop a method-
ology for tracking the evolution of distributions. For simplicity, we assume that the initial
distribution is uniform, which is the invariant distribution in the inﬂationary steady state.
However, our methodology could be applied to any initial distribution.
Let g(·) b et h ef u n c t i o no ft i m ew h i c hg i v e st h en e x ta d j u s t m e n tt i m e . T h e ng(t)=
t+τ(t).20 In order to calculate the price level at a time after the announcement, we use the
function g to relate the measure of ﬁrms which set their actual prices at a speciﬁct i m eu to
the measure of ﬁrms at times before u that would have their next adjustment at u (those
times are g−1(u)).L e t Z(t) be the correspondence that assigns to t the set of times when
the current prices were last adjusted. Formally:
Z(t)={s : s ≤ t and g(s) >t }.
Let g−1(S) be the inverse image of the set S under g. Then, g−1(Z(t)) is the set of
adjustment times for which the next adjustment would be in Z(t). To evaluate the average
price at t we need to know the probability measure v of the ﬁrms which adjust at subsets of
Z(t). We can easily relate this measure to the measure ϕ in subsets g−1(Z(t)),s i n c ev is the








We apply the above formula recursively by relating distributions and adjustment time
sets during disinﬂation to distributions and sets at preceding times. We proceed this way
until we arrive at a set g−n(Z(t)) such that the measure of ﬁrms adjusting at the subset of
times of this set corresponds to the uniform distribution of the inﬂationary steady state.
20During credible disinﬂations g tends to be nondecreasing, since ﬁrms tend to choose longer contract
lengths. In the case of imperfect credibility, g decreases at the moment the disinﬂation policy is abandoned
(see Bonomo and Carvalho, 2003).
12When strategic complementarities are absent, the aggregation and the individual optimal
rule problems can be solved separately. Hence, we ﬁrst solve for the optimal rule and then
use the resulting g(·) function to aggregate individual prices as described above.
When there are strategic complementarities, we use an iterative method. We guess a
solution for the aggregation problem, i.e. a path for p(·), and solve the optimal rule problem
given p(·) to ﬁnd g(·) and x(·). We then aggregate according to the methodology above to
ﬁnd a new path for p(·). We continue until convergence of both p(·), g(·) and x(·).
3 Disinﬂation Results
In this section we present both individual and aggregate results for a cold turkey disinﬂation
under perfect credibility.
In this case, the money supply path is given by:
m(t)=µt, t < 0;
= µ
0t, t ≥ 0.
We refer to the case of µ0 =0as “full disinﬂation,” while µ>µ 0 > 0 corresponds to a
“partial disinﬂation.”
When strategic complementarities are absent (θ =1 ), the optimization problem for ﬁrms
which readjust/collect information after the announcement is the same as that under the
steady state with the new money growth rate µ0.
When there are strategic complementarities (θ<1), the problem of ﬁrms adjusting after
the announcement is no longer equivalent to the steady state problem with the new money
growth rate. The optimal price and contract length will depend partly on prices which
were set prior to the disinﬂation announcement. Since the optimal price depends on the
aggregate price, the solution requires solving simultaneously for the optimal pricing rule and
the aggregate price level.
We start by showing individual results concerning the optimal contract lengths.
133.1 Individual rules
Figure 3 shows the value of τ(t) chosen by ﬁrms before and after the announcement of a
full disinﬂation for several parameter combinations, in the absence of strategic complemen-
tarities. For example, if the initial inﬂation is 10% a year, the money supply stabilization
leads to an increase in the time between adjustments from 7.5 months to 14 months. As
expected the decrease in the frequency of adjustments is larger when initial inﬂation is higher
as compared to the variance of idiosyncratic shocks.
When there are strategic complementarities, there is a transition phase between steady
state values. Our main ﬁndings are represented in Table 1. The contract length jumps up
immediately after the announcement, decreases slightly for a brief period of time and then
increases again, converging to the new steady state level. The gradual increase in contract
length occurs because inﬂation is still decreasing during some time after the announcement.21
Since the diﬀerence to the new steady state level is always small, the contract length is similar
to the one obtained without strategic complementarities. We can conclude that strategic
complementarities do not substantially aﬀect optimal contract lengths, although as we will
see below, they have important consequences to the dynamics of disinﬂation.22
3.2 Aggregate eﬀects
Now we turn to the aggregate results. We examine several cases: full disinﬂa t i o nw i t hn o
strategic complementarities, and with strategic complementarities, partial disinﬂation, and
disinﬂation from diﬀerent initial inﬂation levels.
3.2.1 Full disinﬂation with no strategic complementarities
We start with the very particular case in which money growth is reduced to zero and there
are no strategic complementarities in price. In this simple case, each ﬁrm adjusting after
stabilization will set its price equal to the constant money supply,23 notwithstanding the
21The intial decrease is due to the nonlinearities of the model.
22The solution of the optimization problem involves computing V 0 (t + τ (t)).W h e nθ =1 , V 0 (s)=0for
all s>0. With strategic complementarities, V 0 (t + τ (t)) is of the order of 10−5 for all t>0( θ =0 .1),a n d
we therefore set it equal to zero.
23Except for idiosyncratic shocks.
14contract length. Thus, after all ﬁrms have adjusted, the average price will be equal to the
money supply. All ﬁrms will have adjusted their prices when a time equal to the contract
length prevailing during the inﬂationary steady state has elapsed. Therefore the aggregate
eﬀect of disinﬂation hinges on the prices and contract lengths chosen before the announce-
ment, and the change of contract lengths will have no aggregate eﬀect. As a consequence,
starting from a given inﬂationary steady state in which the contract length is optimal, the
eﬀect of disinﬂation with endogenous rules is identical to that under exogenous rules.
3.2.2 Full disinﬂation with strategic complementarities
When there are strategic complementarities, the previous equivalence does not hold anymore.
The optimal price will not be constant (neglecting the idiosyncratic component) after t =0 ,
being inﬂuenced by prices set before t =0 . The endogeneity of contracts changes the
dynamics of disinﬂation. Figures 4a and 4b depict results for disinﬂations starting from
µ =0 .1 and µ =1 , respectively. The increase in the contract length causes the recession to
last longer than in the case of exogenous rules. On the other hand, longer contracts induce
ﬁrms to set lower prices, since inﬂation is declining. As a result, the minimum output level
is higher with endogenous rules. Observe that during the recession there are some time
intervals in which the output level is constant. The reason is that, after all prices are reset
for the ﬁr s tt i m ef o l l o w i n gt h ea n n o u n c e m e n t ,t h e r ei sat i m ei n t e r v a lw h e r en oa d j u s t m e n t
takes place. Therefore the aggregate price remains constant during this interval. Its duration
corresponds to the increase in the contract length.
3.2.3 Partial disinﬂation
In the more realistic case of a partial disinﬂation endogeneity matters even in the case
of no strategic complementarities. As depicted in Figure 5, the recession is more intense
than with exogenous rules, reversing the result obtained with full disinﬂation and strategic
complementarities. The reason is that individual prices set after the announcement are higher
with endogenous rules because they will remain ﬁxed for a longer period during which the
money supply will continue to increase. As in the case of full disinﬂation with strategic
complementarities, the recession lasts longer with endogenous rules.
15Another diﬀerence is that in the case of exogenous rules there will be no output eﬀects
after a time interval equal to the contract length, since every ﬁrm will be adjusting its price
taking into consideration the new money growth rate and the distribution of adjustments
will continue to be uniform. In the endogenous rules case, there will be output cycles because
of the irregularities of the new distribution of adjustments.24
3.2.4 Diﬀerent initial inﬂation levels
Even in the particular case of no strategic complementarities and full disinﬂation, the model
with endogenous rules allows us to appropriately compare the cost of disinﬂation for diﬀerent
initial inﬂation levels. In models with exogenous rules, if we take the contract length as ﬁxed
and compare disinﬂations from diﬀerent initial inﬂation rates, the length of the recession is
invariant. The initial inﬂation level aﬀects only the intensity of the recession, as in Ball
(1994) (Figure 6a). When the endogeneity of rules is taken into consideration, a higher
initial inﬂation makes the recession more severe, but shorter (Figure 6b). The intuition is
straightforward. A higher initial inﬂation implies shorter contracts and prices that are set
foreseeing a higher inﬂation. The hangover eﬀect of ﬁxed prices is higher initially, inducing
a stronger recession. When all prices are reset after the announcement, i.e. after a period
of time equal to the initial contract length has elapsed, the recession is over. Thus, the
recession is shorter when the initial inﬂation is higher because the time between adjustments
is smaller.
We conclude that there is a trade-oﬀ between intensity and duration of the recession. As
a consequence, the commonly held belief that it is easier to disinﬂate when inﬂation is higher
because the degree of nominal rigidity is lower (see, for example, Blanchard 1997) must be
qualiﬁe d .T h i si so n l yt r u ei fi ti se a s i e rf o rt h ee c o n o m yt ob e a rt h ec o s to fas h o r t e rb u t
more intense recession.
24The periods in which no adjustments take place will correspond to periods of output growth, since
money growth is positive. After this interval, because the contract length is now longer, individual prices
will be subject to larger adjustments when compared to the exogenous case, while the density of ﬁrms
adjusting will be the one corresponding to the old steady state. Therefore the aggregate price will increase
at a faster rate than money growth, reducing output gradually. This cycle will repeat itself because this
irregular distribution will be replicated indeﬁnitely.
164 Reevaluation at the time of announcement
One common criticism to time-dependent rules is that ﬁrms keep their prices ﬁxed until the
scheduled time for price adjustment, even if there is some change in the economic environ-
ment. This assumption does not seem to be harmful for moderate regime changes, since
the cost of gathering information and making decisions is precisely one of the reasons why
price adjustments do not occur continuously.25 However, a credible and substantial change
in monetary policy will probably become a free information that will not be ignored by price
setters, since it could aﬀect ﬁrms’ proﬁts substantially. In this case, it is sensible to com-
bine the strict time-dependent model with the hypothesis that ﬁrms reevaluate their pricing
policies at the time of the announcement.
In this section, we modify our model by assuming that the information about the mone-
tary regime change is freely available, which implies allowing ﬁrms to re-evaluate their pricing
p o l i c i e sa tt h et i m eo ft h ea n n o u n c e m e n t . W ea s s u m et h a ti no r d e rt oa d j u s ta n do b s e r v e
innovations in their own market ﬁrms are still subject to the same adjustment/information
costs. We then compare the results with the ones obtained under strict time-dependent rules.
A tt h et i m eo fa n n o u n c e m e n t( t =0 ), a ﬁrm i, which had its last adjustment at time
−T, has the option of revising its planned adjustment time. Formally, its value function at
time zero is given by:
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where τR is the new (revised) time for the next adjustment, V R is the revised value function
at time zero, and V is the value function deﬁned by 12. The optimal choice of τR depends
on the last time of adjustment −T. If there is an interior solution to 15, it should satisfy
25Another possible criticism to this assumptionis is that they could infer the information about the optimal
price from freely observable variablesl, such as their own output. While valid at the microeconomic level,
this criticism is of no consequence for our aggregate results, since for a microeconomic departure of the
model to have aggregate implications it is necessary that this departure results from simultaneous actions
of a non-negligible number of ﬁrms in the same direction. However, the probability that a non-negligible
number of ﬁrms receive a large idiosyncratic shock in the same
direction, at the same time, is also negligible.





















Notice that adjusting immediately is one of the available options, implying a corner
s o l u t i o n .I ft h i sc h o i c ei so p t i m a lf o rs o m e−T, the value function becomes:
V
R (−T)=F + V (0). (17)
In the case of no strategic complementarities, for any τR, V (τR)=V0,w h e r eV0 corre-
sponds to the expected present value of costs in the zero inﬂation steady state. Then the










The marginal cost corresponds to the additional expected proﬁtl o s sf r o md e v i a t i n gf r o m
the frictionless optimal price. The ﬁrst term is the square of the deviation of the price
with respect to the expected optimal price,26 while the second term is the accumulated
uncertainty about the idiosyncratic component. The marginal beneﬁt of postponement,
which corresponds to the right-hand side of (16), simpliﬁes to:
MgB = ρ(F + V0). (18)
It corresponds to the sum of the ﬂow beneﬁts of postponing both the payment of the
adjustment cost (ρF) and the total intertemporal costs evaluated as of the time of adjustment
(ρV0).
The marginal cost is increasing in τR, but depends also on the time elapsed since the
last adjustment T, while the marginal beneﬁt does not depend on either τR or T.T h e r e
is always a set of T’ sf o rw h i c ht h em a r g i n a lc o s to fp o s t p o n i n ga na d j u s t m e n ta tz e r oi s
lower than the marginal beneﬁt. Thus, for those T’s, the new adjustment will be at some
26Recall that z∗ is the price deviation set at the beginning of the contract, under an inﬂationary steady-
state. Thus, z∗ − µT is the expected price deviation T periods after the beginning of the contract.
18time τR > 0 such that the marginal cost of postponement equals the marginal beneﬁt. If for
some T the marginal cost of postponing the adjustment starting from zero is higher than
the marginal beneﬁt, then it will be optimal to adjust immediately.
Notice that the fall of inﬂation causes a reduction in the intertemporal costs, represented
by the value function. Thus, the marginal beneﬁt of postponement is suddenly reduced when
disinﬂation is announced, but the marginal cost of postponement remains the same at time
zero. Then the marginal beneﬁt of postponement will become instantaneously smaller than
the marginal cost for a set of ﬁrms, triggering immediate price adjustments.
Figure 7 shows the newly chosen time of adjustment after disinﬂation announcement,
τR,a saf u n c t i o no ft h et i m ee l a p s e ds i n c et h el a s ta d j u s t m e n tT for several initial inﬂation
rates. All curves are concave, contrasting with the planned linear curves τP.27 For a 3%
initial inﬂation, only a small set of ﬁrms who had planned to adjust a little bit after the
announcement chooses to reset their prices immediately. By comparing this curve with the
curve of planned adjustment times, we see that, except for a small group of ﬁrms that
adjusted “a long time ago” or that had adjusted recently, most ﬁrms choose to lengthen
their contracts (Figure 8a). For a 10% initial inﬂation rate, the concavity is accentuated
and the τR curve is no longer increasing (Figure 8b). The reason is that the ﬁrms that
had just adjusted ﬁnd themselves with too high a price for a zero inﬂation environment.
Those ﬁrms will want to readjust sooner than the ones that adjusted earlier but have their
prices closer to the expected optimal level. For a 30% inﬂation the pattern becomes more
accentuated, and both ﬁrms that were closer to their next adjustment time and ﬁrms that
had adjusted recently choose to reset their prices immediately (Figure 8c). Now the set
of ﬁrms that chooses to postpone their adjustment times is reduced. Thus, with higher
inﬂation, more ﬁrms decide to reset their prices at the time of announcement and less ﬁrms
choose to lengthen their contracts.
In Figures 9a,9b, and 9c we display the output paths for disinﬂation with and without
re-evaluation, for 3%, 10% and 30% initial inﬂations, respectively. For a 3% initial inﬂation
rate, re-evaluation has little impact, and the output paths are similar. With higher initial
inﬂation rates, the diﬀerence increases. Three features are noteworthy: the recession starts
27Formally τP(−T)=−T + τ∗(µ).
19immediately, is less deep, and is longer. The reason for the jump down in the output
level is the substantial price resetting at time zero, with more upward than downward price
adjustments. The recession is attenuated with respect to the strict time-dependent case
because most of the hangover eﬀect is mitigated by the anticipated adjustments of ﬁrms
with high relative prices. Finally, the recession is longer because a group of ﬁrms with prices
higher but close to the expected optimal level will choose to lengthen their contracts.28
5C o n c l u s i o n
One of the main methodological weaknesses in the literature which relates nominal rigidities
and costs of disinﬂation is that pricing rules are invariant to policy regimes. This paper tries
to ﬁll this gap. We had to proceed in three steps. First we rationalized ﬁxed price time-
dependent rules as optimal rules. Second, we derived a methodology for simultaneously
ﬁnding optimal rules during disinﬂation experiments and aggregating pricing rules under
non-steady state conditions. And ﬁnally, we used the methodology of aggregation in the
disinﬂation experiments to evaluate their results.
The methodology we developed is fairly general, being based on Bellman equations for
the individual problem and on a recursive mapping of the measure of ﬁrms adjusting at
each time for aggregation. Furthermore, our methodology allows us to account for strategic
complementarities in prices, which are often neglected in the literature due to the technical
diﬃculties they pose.
T h er e s u l t ss h o wt h a tt h ee ﬀort was not vain, that is, the endogeneity of rules matters.
We can summarize our main ﬁndings as follows: i) so long as money growth is not cut to
zero, disinﬂation tends to have a stronger negative eﬀect on output than when assessed with
invariant rules; ii) the recession tends to last longer in the endogenous rules setting; iii) a
higher initial inﬂation generates a deeper and shorter recession.
We also modiﬁed the strict time-dependent model by allowing re-evaluation of pricing
28One could think that ﬁrms with prices close but lower than the expected optimal level would do the
same, neutralizing the eﬀect. However, those ﬁrms had their last adjustment earlier than the ones with prices
higher than the expected optimal level. As a consequence, they have higher marginal cost of postponement
due to accumulated uncertainty about the idiosyncratic component.
20policies when there is an important piece of news. Re-evaluation has non-trivial impacts
on disinﬂation results. For a suﬃciently low initial inﬂation the results are similar to the
pure time-dependent model. For more sizeable inﬂations, three features are noteworthy:
the recession starts immediately and abruptly, is less deep, and is longer than in the strict
time-dependent model with endogenous rules.
The endogeneity of rules also allows proper examination of the role of credibility on the
output costs of disinﬂation. This is done in a sequel paper (Bonomo and Carvalho, 2003).29
29This issue is examined by Ball (1995) in a ﬁxed price time-dependent model with exogenous rules, and
by Almeida and Bonomo (2002) in a model with endogenous state-dependent rules.
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25To prove the sign of the expressions (a.) through (e.) we used the following inequality
(for x>0):
e
x > 1+x, (19)
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The ﬁrst expression between square brackets is obviously positive because of (19). We
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Notice that the right hand side of the above expression is 0 for u =0 .T a k i n go n c ea g a i n
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This expression is equal to 0 for u =0 , and is greater than 0 for u>0. This latter result
26follows from (19). Thus Den00
2 (u) > 0 for u>0, which implies that Den0
2 (u) > 0 for u>0,
and ﬁnally that Den2(u) > 0 for u>0.
By an analogous process we found the signs of the numerators of expressions (a.) through
(e.).
Appendix B
Here we show that in steady state the aggregate price level does, in fact, grow at rate
µ. Using the method of undetermined coeﬃcients we assume that the price level evolves







where x(s) is the average price set by ﬁrms which adjust at s a n dw ea s s u m e dt h a tp r i c e
adjustments are uniformly staggered over time.30 Since the idiosyncratic shock is the only
component speciﬁct oﬁrm i and vanishes with the averaging,
x(s)=xi(s) − ei(s)=p
∗
i (s)+z(s) − ei(s).
We then ﬁnd the expressions for a and b that are consistent with the resulting equation
























30This is a natural assumption for the steady state since the uniform distribution is the only time-invariant
distribution.
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Thus, in steady state, both p(t) and p∗
i (t) grow at the same constant rate µ.
28Table 1: Optimal Pricing Rule with Strategic Complementarities
θ =0 .1 σ =3 %ρ =2 .5% F =0 .000595.
time µ =1 0 % µ =1 0 0 % time
t<0 0.63 0.152 t<0
t =0 1.154 1.154 t =0
t1 =0 .22 1.148 1.138 t1 =0 .18
t>1.13 1.155 1.155 t>0.98
Obs.: we report contract lengths before disinﬂation (t<0), at the time of the announce-
ment (t =0 ), at the time when the shortest contract after the announcement is reached (t1)



















































































































































Output - Steady State
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Figure 6a. Obs: In both paths contract length is optimal for a 3% inflation.
Partial Disinflation



















Different Initial Inflation Rates - Exogenous Rules











































































































Different Initial Inflation Rates - Endogenous Rules

















































































































































































Output with and without Reevaluation






















Output with and without Reevaluation





















Output with and without Reevaluation










-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
t
y
(
t
)
with 
reevaluation
without 
reevaluation
37